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"The central problem of our time--one that is shared by all races and national'ties--is to discot_r
the things, the qualities, and interests that people have in common so that durable institutions can
he designed for mankind's survival. "
--Justice William {1 Douglas
INTRODUCTION
Despite the international agreement that accompanied the
inception of the Outer Space Treaty, in the decades since its
appearance in international law, factions within some nations have
sought to evi._erate the progressive, peaceful, and painstakingly
developed concepts it contains. Both the spirit and meaning of
the Treaty have been attacked through contending interpretations
advanced by international lawyers, politicians, and businesspeople.
Many of the interpretations are, ultimately, premised on the
erroneous belief that the infinity of space and its resources cannot
provide for all Earth's people in peace. At its very core, there can
be no other reason for the sophisticated and complicated
maneuvering occurring among the nations. Yet this belief is, by
nature, a short-term one as it results from limited access to space.
Increased access will decrease fear of insufficiency and thus the
perceived need to fight for resources. The time has come to
reconsider where a course of action, based upon an inaccurate
perception of space, is leading.
The "common heritage of mankind" and the "province of all
mankind" are different legal concepts developed in international
space law during the last quarter of a century. The term "province
of all mankind" appears in Article 1 of the 1967 Treaty on
Principles C_)verning the Activities of Stages in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) that established the primary basis
for the legal order of space. The term "common heritage of all
mankind" is contained in Article 11 of the 1979 Treaty on
Principles (kwerning Activities on the Mcxm and Other Celestial
Bodies (Moon Treaty) and the Law of the Sea Convention (Sea
Treaty).
Since the initial appearance of these provisions in international
law, controversy has arisen regarding their intent and meaning ms
applied to a nation's right to explore and use a common
environment such as space or the high seas and a nation's
obligation to share benefits derived from those environments with
the rest of the world. As can be expected, different interpretations
are currently competing for acceptance. This is ,so, in part,
Ix-cause, in the case of the Outer Space Treaty, although a general
principle was articulated, rules for acceptance and application of
the principles were not. In the case of the Moon and Sea Treaties,
although an effort has been made to clarify both meaning and
application, the articulations are still too vague for legal certainty.
Rather than detail the legal merits and deficiencies of all
competing interpretations of the two provisions, this paper wiU
focus on the fact that the_ concepts are already currently
available tools for the advancemen: of both global and U.S.
interests but, because of the labyrinthine legal arguments that have
been generated and some assumptions being held, they are in
danger of being lost as such tools. The tendency of many
observers in the U.S. to confuse the concepts of "province of all
mankind" and "common heritage of mankind" and to as,snme that
both are incompatible with U.S. commercial space interests will
also be addressed. It is suggested that reconsidering these
provisions can yield positions compatible with U.S. interests and
that it can and should actively ,seek the use of these provisions
as a basis for global cooperation and commercial benefit.
THE PROVINCE OF ALL MANKIND AND THE
COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
In negotiating the Outer Space Treaty, both the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. put forward proposals that contained similar basic
concepts. The final draft of Article 1, paragraph 1 of the treaty
adopted almost exactly the language of the 1966 Soviet draft
(Ch_tol, 1982). It provides, "The exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
tarried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific develop-
ment, and shall be the province of all mankind' (Outer Space
lPeaty, 1967; emphasis added).
It was not until the negotiations of the Sea Treaty were under-
way that the term "common heritage of mankind" was used. later,
it was included in Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Moon Treaty,
which reads, "The moon and its natural resources are the
comrmm hen'tage of mankind, which finds expre._sion in the
provisions of this Agreement, in particular in paragraph 5 of this
article" (Mc_on Treaty, 1979; emphasis added).
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A cursory look at the history of these two phrases shows a
divergence in interpretation from three main quarters: the U.S.,
the U.S.S.R., and the collection of nations known generally as the
Less Developed Countries (LDCs). By the time negotiations for
the Moon Treaty had gained momentum, the U.S. generally
understood "common heritage of mankind" and "the province of
all mankind" to be indistinguishable and, as such, they were
considered an expansion of the international legal principle of res
communis, which traditionally meant that the res, the thing
involved, may not become the subject of appropriation by states
(Robinson and White, 1986, p. 187). The U.S.S.R. never accepted
the common heritage concept, objecting to its roots in bourgeois
Roman Law (Dekanozov, 1974), and later came to distinguish
between it and the "province of all mankind" concept (Mafigrsky,
1986). The LDCs collectively evolved the opinion that since most
international law developed prior to their attaining nationhood
status, they were not generally bound by its tenets (Robinson and
White, 1986, p. 187). Thus, they argued, although they accepted
the Charter of the United Nations, they were free to define
international law as it applied to them. When it came to defining
the "province of all mankind" principle, it meant all nations had
vested rights in common resources and should be shared
equitably among them (Robinson and White, 1986, p. 188). In
the Law of the Sea negotiations, therefore, the LDCs led the move
away from "the province of all mankind" provision as contained
in the Outer Space Treaty and toward "the common heritage of
mankind" provision that was later incorporated into the Moon
Treaty.
This frenetic environment has given rise to volumes of com-
peting definitions, arguments, and positions regarding the legal
ramifications of the mankind provisions, the Outer Space, Sea, and
Moon Treaties--all to varying degrees of vagueness. As one
commentator has observed, "given the poor and inadequate
substance of the generalized formulas used in space law, their
interpretations have largely been attributed to individual States...
[l]n the field of international law, space law has been largely
conceived as international 'softlaw'" (Bueckling 1979). The
practical result of this has been the failure to articulate,
internationally, the legal substance of these subjects. The chaotic
state of international space law does, however, provide a void that,
if implanted with the seed of a transformational idea, can become
pregnant with possibility.
OF LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
MANKIND PROVISIONS
Supporting the concerns of the spacefaring nations, it is true
that there is much in the legal history of both the Moon and Sea
Treaties to advance the more restrictive "common heritage of
mankind" provision that could inhibit the use and exploration of
space by nations and private entities with the ability to do so.
At the same time, supporting the concerns of the nonspacefaring
nations, it is equally true that the same history could yield support
for what they see as unreasonable exploitation. These and other
positions are amply argued in the legal literature (Cocca, 1986).
Some of the world's finest legal minds, prompted by everything
from fear and promise of profit to scholarship, high purpose, and
humanitarianism, have struggled with the intent and meaning of
the mankind provisions for nearly three decades. Yet the con-
troversial provisions are still in dire need of specific applications
(Panel Session, 1982). The law, absent political will, can go no
further.
The definition and application of the "province of all mankind"
and "common heritage of mankind" provisions are now primarily
a political problem and are, therefore, only subject to a political
solution. Without supportive political action to develop the law
of space, space lawyers are reduced to the twentieth century
version of arguing the number of angels that can sit on the head
of a pin.
Politicians and citizens must claim responsibility and work with
the lawyers to develop the mankind provisions. The necessity of
uniting law and politics, along with "philosophy and morality" was
identified long before the current controversy over the mankind
provisions (Gorove, 1972, p. 402).
A STRATEGIC DISTINCTION
That the "province of all mankind" provision of the Outer Space
Treaty is declaratory in nature and not a specific legal maxim is
well supported in the legal literature. The Outer Space Treaty
"was intended to be an ideological charter for the Space Age.
Readings of the debates, resolutions, and ratifying documents
surrounding the Outer Space Treaty confirm its quasi-con-
stitutional function. It was to create a set of fundamental prin-
ciples that should be adhered to in all subsequent agreements and
treaties" (Robinson and White, 1986, p. 181). In the controver-
sies subsequent to the formulation of the fundamental principles,
the legal accuracy required for their application went "off-course
on the ocean of facts" (Bueckinp_ 1979, p. 17) with each nation
or group of nations steering its own independent course in a
different direction, until those courses have become seemingly
irreconcilable. However, much of what is seemingly irreconcilable
lies in the continuing confusion between the "province of all
mankind" and the "common heritage of mankind."
Yet a strategic distinction does exist between the two concepts.
Specifically, it is that the "province of all mankind" provision
contained in the Outer Space Treaty refers to "activities (explor-
ation and use)" and that the "common heritage" provision as
contained in the Moon Treaty refers to "material objects"--i.e.,
the former relates to, but is not the same as, the latter (Ma/omky,
1986).
Additional support for such a distinction recently emerged from
the U.S. In a Directive on National Space Policy issued 11 February
1988, the Reagan Administration, while not claiming property
rights in space materials, did announce that "The United States
considers the space systems of any nation to be national property."
"Systems" and "activities" are analogous in that they both suggest
a productive dynamic in which materials are a component. As
such, the component contributes to the overall value of the
activity or system, but if isolated and/or unattainable, its inherent
value substantially decreases, if it exists at all.
BUILDING UPON THE DISTINCTION
Let us consider the political possibilities that this legal
distinction creates. A major objection to the Outer Space Treaty
that currently exists in the U.S. arises from the general belief that
its "province of all mankind" provision inhibits private enterprise
because it interferes with an individual or corporate entrepre-
neur's right to profit from the fruits of his or her labor in space.
"Fruits" are generally considered to be resources such as mined
ore, manufactured water, etc. However, "the common heritage of
mankind" provision does not appear in The Outer Space Treaty-
only the "province of all mankind" provision does. Therefore,
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applying the distinction between "activities" and "materials" ah)ng
with Article 6 of the Outer Space Treaty, which allows nongovern-
mental entities to participate in space "activities," would enable
the U.S. space community to support the Treaty without
relinquishing its conviction that private enterprise in space ought
to be profitable by exercising control over its processed space
materials.
Supporting the "materials-activities" distinction would render
clearer support for the Outer Space Treaty. Thus two of the major
spacefaring nations, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., would be able to
work toward establishing a clear legal order in space. The history
of space law is filled with evidence of the great progress made
when these two giants move in unison. A position advocating that
"the province of all mankind" relates to space activities is, in fact,
supported by the customs of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. space
programs in which non-nationals have already participated on a
regular and extensive basis.
The current legal status of the three treaties in which the
controversial provisions are included makes it possible for the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. to join in strengthening the Outer Space Treaty.
As of March 1987, the Outer Space Treaty has been ratified by
86 states, including the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and signed by 91. The
Sea Treaty has 30 of the 60 ratifications needed to bring it into
force, while the Moon Treaty, which, by its own terms, entered
into force on 11 July 1985, has been signed by only 11 nations
and ratified by 7. This tally demonstrates the opporttmity to build
upon the declaratory nature of the "province of all mankind"
provision as contained in the Outer Space Treaty in order to
establish its meaning and application before it is further confused
with either the Sea Treaty or the Moon Treaty.
The Sea Treaty does not have the necessary number of
ratifications at present and therefore simply is not yet in legal
competition with the Outer Space Treaty. The Moon Treaty, while
it may have entered into force by its own terms, also, by its own
terms, severely limits the "common heritage of mankind" concept
to that single document (Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 5) and to
the states that are party to it (Article 11, paragraph 7b). Further,
also by its own terms, the Moon Treat), leaves the determination
of the application of the common heritage provision to a future
regime that is not to be established until "exploitation is to
become feasible" (Article 11, paragraph 5). The Treaty itself and
its applications are not subject to a review conference until 5 to
10 years after the treaty enters into force (Article 18).
This leaves a stretch cff time in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
acting upon the authority of the Outer Space Treaty, can work
together to establish, with legal certainty, the meaning and appli.
cation of the "province of all mankind" provision. This effort
would be particularly productive because the Outer Space Treaty
has an unusual character in international law. That is, it is the
foundation of an interrelated "framework for a number of limited
accords between individual countries and intergovernmental
ot_nizations, as well as for ,several subsequent treaties" (Robin.
son and White, 1986, p. 182). Therefore, ff the provision of the
Outer Space Treaty were to achieve legal specificity, it is
reasonable to accept that the specificity should be incorporated
into the framework already built upon the treaty itself, thus
bringing uniformity to the entire body of international space law.
THE LDCs
A political effort by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to establish the
legal accuracy of the "province of all mankind" provision based
on its declaratory nature in the Outer Space Treaty must be
carried out in absolute good faith toward the LDCs. The intensity
of the conflict between spacefaring and nonspacefaring nations--
developed and developing nations--regarding the interpretation
of the "province" and "heritage" provisions demonstrates that they
all want to be able to share in space development, and generally
for the same reasons. Rather than the unaligned views of these
provisions presenting insuperable obstacles to profitable space
development, they in fact lx)int to the probability that, if properly
facilitated within a supportive structure, cooperation and com-
promise can occur.
That the LDCs have found it necessary to band together
regarding the interpretation of these provisions stands as frank
testimony of their fear of having their own national interests
trampled in a frantic race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to
recklessly exploit space and the seas. For the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
to come together, in any agreement, to advance the international
body of space law at the expense of the IJ)('s is as unproductive
as not coming together at all.
That would shatter the reality that it is in the interests of
currently nonspacefaring nations to support nations that do have
the capability. To unfairly compromise the interests of the nations
most able to go into space compromises the return of any of its
benefits for everyone.
Conversely, it is not in the interest of the spacefaring nations
to wantonly exploit space without regard for the needs and
desires of the other nations with which they share Earth. Like
mighty oaks that refuse to flex with changing winds, strong
spacefaring nations can also become isolated and break.
The "activities" and "materials" distinction can lift LDC_ from
the theoretical bog in which the _m-ious arguments are currently
mired and provide immediate results. The legal accuracy the
distinction provides would enable them to free their creative
energy to build on what is, rather than .squander it on what might
be. The "'activities" and "materials" distinction provides a natural
rational to advance real and current activities like lntelsat, the
International Young Astronauts Program, Project Share, the
Ireland-Jordan exchange for training water management workers,
and the exchange of medical lectures between the U.S. and
African nations (Levin, 1982 ). A plan implemented to dramatically
increase the number and quality of these kinds of endeavors can
quickly bring the interests of spacefaring nations and nonspace-
faring nations closer together.
Neither the Sea nor the Moon Treaties has been accepted to
the great degree with which the Outer Space Treaty has. The truth
is that the "common heritage of mankind" concept is in a legal
limlx)--a limbo that is further extended by the Moon Treaty's
deferral of the application of the concept until resource exploi-
tation becomes "feasible."
Whatever else may be unclear alxmt the application of the
"province" or "heritage" of mankind provisions, one thing is
abundantly clear: without access to celestial resources, its
exploitation will never be "feasible." Further, of what value is
lunar ore? None, unless an economically viable, systematic activity
is in place to obtain it.
For the vast maiority of developing states, national means of
space access is simply impossible. Accepting the "activities-
materials" distinction would give these nations immediate
participation in what is feasible now. While doing so, they gain
access to political decisions that give force to legal principles, now
and in the future. Additionally, the distinction makes it un-
necessary for any nation to change its ratification decisions as they'
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pertain to the more controversial Moon Treaty. Without having
to change their current positions, the LDCs could be active
partners in the negotiations and determinations that would be
necessary in implementing shared activities and which could ripen
into a wider understanding and acceptance of the goals of the
Moon Treaty. And, as activities develop, it will become necessary
to find ways to share the materials inherently necessary to that
development for the sake of the ongoing success of the activities.
THE U.S., COMMERCIALIZATION,
THE MANKIND PROVISIONS,
AND THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
Considering a new strategic opportunity is, of course, an
invitation to the U.S. to reconsider its current position. In the fray
over the mankind provisions, U.S. observers have generally
adopted the view that they stand as an obstacle to the
advancement of the interests of the U.S. in space and should be,
if not abandoned, justifiably ignored. This is so, according to this
view, because of the fear that treaty provisions exclude private
commercial enterprise and can force distribution of space
resources among all nations with little regard to the investment
made by the nation or organization that actually obtained them.
The tragedy is that evading the mankind provisions because of
this definition supports and gives credence to the very ideology
that the position is intended to resist.
Disavowal of the mankind provisions on the grounds that they
are anti-commercial and anti-free enterprise is tacit acceptance
that they are anti-commercial and anti-free enterprise. Tacitly
accepting that the mankind provisions inhibit free enterprise has
an undesirable fourfold effect for the U.S. First, it helps create a
self-fulfilling prophecy in which the successful formal adoption of
the anti-commercial meaning becomes more likely. Second, failing
to establish a pro-commercial definition of the mankind provisions
makes it more difficult for nations that are currently taking anti-
commercial positions to change their positions if they were to
come to believe it would be in their interest to do so. Third,
failing to take a stand is reactionary and therefore inherently less
powerful than making a choice to create a definition. Fourth, not
taking a stand is contrary to the U.S.'s historical commitment to
the pursuit of freedom.
There are alternatives to tacitly accepting that the mankind
provisions stand for less than freedom to responsibly develop the
space environment. At one end of the spectrum political options
exist. Without a domestic political drive to establish the meaning
and application of the provisions, fertile ground for nurturing
international support, cooperation, and real growth of space
development--public and private--would be given up. Abandon-
ing the mankind provisions is also contrary to the view of the
National Commission on Space, which states "that the existing
United Nations treaties that [the United States has] ratified provide
a sufficient legal framework for the future uses of space." A
vigorous, intentional, and openly visible policy of utilizing the best
of nearly three decades of precedent to maintain a flee enterprise
meaning of the mankind provisions can be declared and pursued
by the U.S. Doing this, the U.S. would be building on its early
active, pro-commercial history in the adoption of the Outer Space
Treaty.
The original intention behind the "pro_Snce of all mankind"
provision in the Outer Space Treaty was to create a new regime
for its application. This provides the U.S. with an alternative to
its current experience of being unable to advance its own
interests and those of space development in general because of
the "politicization and bureaucratization" (NCOS, 1986) of the
United Nations bodies that are responsible for formulating space
policy. On the authority of the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. could
join the U.S.S.R. in its 1985 call to create a new international space
law organization and thus create anew what has become rigid in
the old.
At the other end of the spectrum legal options exist. Chief
among the treaties that the National Commission on Space
considers as providing a sufficient legal framework for the future
uses of space is the Outer Space Treaty. In its ratification process,
the U.S. simultaneously issued a legal opinion of the State
Department (Christol, 1982, pp. 42-43) and an understanding by
the Senate (Christot, 1982, p. 43) respecting the meaning and
application of the "province of all mankind" provision. Also, along
with Ambassador Goldberg's testimony (McDougall, 1985,
p. 418), the U.S. is on record as recognizing that the mankind
provisions of the Treaty are compatible with conducting and
developing free space enterprise and the right to determine how
it shares the benefits and results of U.S. space activities. The U.S.
further strengthened this pro-commercial interpretation in its
1977 response to the 1976 Bogota Declaration (Christol, 1982,
p. 40). In short, there are ways the U.S. can take a bold stand
for both the private and public commercial meaning of the
mankind provisions without resorting to unilateral actions or
impairing its own values.
A particular brand of reaction to the mankind provisions
requires special note. Within the U.S. space community there are
factions that would have the 1967 Outer Space Treaty declared
unconstitutional. It is clear that this position is being taken out
of frustration and anger over the feeble condition of the U.S. space
program and the tragedies it has suffered.
The proponents of this position must be reminded that Article 6
of the U.S. Constitution raises a properly ratified treaty to the
supreme law of the land. Extreme care and thought must be
applied to this particular consideration. Current U.S. history has
demonstrated that even high officials, sworn to uphold the
Constitution, were able to, and did, rationalize breaking their
oaths, abandoning their duty, and violating the Constitution for
their own purposes. The danger of reneging on a properly ratified
treaty is the further erosion of popular respect for the Consti-
tution that can only imperil domestic weLl-being. History has
shown that lack of respect for the rule of law is the first step
to national disintegraton.
Internationally, it is not to be forgotten, either, that were the
U.S. to renege on its original ratification of the Outer Space Treaty,
formally or informally, it would send a signal to other nations to
also treat their ratifications in self-serving ways--ways that,
collectively, would create an environment of lawless uncertainty,
the worst environment for the megaprojects that space devclop-
ment requires. It is a hard fact that for the U.S. to get what it
wants in space, it must keep its word on Earth.
Additionally, the apparent shifts in the U.S.S.R. portend a
possible transformation of the relationship between the U.S.S.R.,
the U.S., and other nations. Much skepticism exists as to the nature
and sincerity of the changes. Mikhail Gorbachev has asked the
West to assist the U.S.S.IL in making a transition to a more modern
commercial power and to help it move away from a military
economy toward a civilian economy. Working with the U.S. within
the Outer Space Treaty will meet Gorbachev's plea for assistance,
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challenge the U.S.S.R. to demonstrate its sincerity, and place the
U.S. at the forefront of innovative peace initiatives in the world
community.
Finally, and most importantly for the U.S., is that beneath the
words of treaties, commercial interests, political plans, and
national positions lies a contest of ideas. One of the competing
ideas is that people can live free and prosper with integrity. This
idea has been held by the people of the U.S. for over two
centuries. It is an important idea. Taking a stand to advance the
mankind provisions and making a commitment to their practical
applications will insure that the idea thrives. And where this idea
thrives, so do we. It is time for the U.S. to get on with the business
of the mankind provisions--a business that was begun by it, bears
its stamp, and could lead to a new beginning for a world in crisis.
CONCLUSION
When, through human industry, a small, round, metal object
obtained a stable orbit above Earth, the mankind provisions
emerged from the communal mind in a moment of principle-
seeking clarity, as it perceived that humanity had made its first
thrust beyond Earth and nothing would ever be the same again.
The provisions simply say that humanity must move on as one,
or it will not be able to move. They recognize the practical
requirements of profound change.
The mankind provisions within the development of space
encompass the most important questions of modern times. They
demand new thinking about strangling historical precedents
regarding resources, technology, and arms. The conflict that
surrounds the mankind provisions, if met with integrity and the
political will to compromise, presents an unparalleled opportunity
for positive advancement in world affairs. The mankind provisions
provide a perspective that requires all nations to honestly consider
how their positions have contributed to the progressive break-
down of what was once one of the most promising paths to
peaceful, productive coexistence both on Earth and in space. This
must be followed by unconditional national commitments to find
and follow that path again.
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